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MOTHER, MAY I? NO, YOU MAY NOT! 
PARENTAL CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR 
STUDENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN STUDENT-LED 
CLUBS AT PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
By: KELLY SHERRILL LINKOUS, ESQ., J.D., PH.D.* 
INTRODUCTION 
The tension between the parent’s rights to direct the upbringing of 
his or her child and the students’ constitutional rights while within the 
schoolhouse gate comes to a head when the parent does not support, or 
allow, his or her children to join an extra-curricular club at school. That 
tension escalates when the child’s religious and speech preferences 
conflict with the parent’s, and when the child’s choice to participate in a 
faith-based club conflicts with those of the parent’s wishes. So, who 
wins? Does a parent always get to determine whether or not her minor 
child may or may not join a club? What if a child holds a different 
religious belief system than his parent and wants to explore that belief 
system through participation in a faith-based, student-led club at school? 
Must he ask, “[m]other, may I?” And what if she says, “[n]o, you may 
not?” In Georgia, as well as in other states and local school districts 
around the nation, a parent’s word is the final decision on whether or not 
a child may join a student-led club.1 
This article considers the constitutionality of laws or policies 
requiring parental consent for student participation in school-based clubs 
or organizations, as well as their consistency with the federal Equal 
                                                                                                             
* Assistant Professor, The George Washington University Graduate School of Education 
and Human Development; Ph.D., 2009, University of Georgia; J.D., with Honors, 2001, 
The George Washington University; M.Ed., summa cum laude, 1997, University of 
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1See, e.g., GA. CODE § 20-2-705 (2006) (parental permission for participation); OKLA. 
STAT. TIT. 70 § 24-105 (2009) (student club and organization—regulation—notifications); 
UTAH CODE §§ 53A-11-1209, 1210 (2007) (parental consent). 
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Access Act (“EAA”).2 This article utilizes the Georgia “parental consent 
for participation in clubs”3 law as a vehicle to analyze the 
constitutionality of comparable participation policies.4 This article 
                                                                                                             
 2 Compare id. (states requiring parental consent) with, The Equal Access Act, 20 
U.S.C. § 4071–74 (2011). 
 3 Ga. Code § 20-2-705 (2006). 
 4 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. TIT. 70 § 24-105 (2009) (student club and organization—
regulation—notifications, provides: 
The policy adopted by each board of education shall provide parents or 
guardians of students with an opportunity to notify school administration 
that the parent or guardian is withholding permission for a student to join or 
participate in one or more clubs or organizations. . . . 
The policy shall only apply to participation in clubs and organizations that 
are extracurricular and shall not apply to participation in clubs and 
organizations that are necessary for a required class of instruction. Parents 
or guardians shall be responsible for preventing their student from 
participating in a club or organization in which permission is withheld. . . . 
Parents or guardians shall also be responsible for retrieving their student 
from attendance at a club or organization in which permission is withheld. 
Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a club or organization from meeting 
when a student who is not authorized to be in the club or organization is 
present at such meeting.); 
Utah Code §§ 53A-11-1209 (2007) (provides: 
(1) A school shall require written parental or guardian consent for student 
participation in all curricular and noncurricular clubs at the school. 
(2) Membership in curricular clubs is governed by the following rules: 
(a) (i) membership may be limited to students who are currently attending 
the sponsoring school or school district; and 
(ii) members who attend a school other than the sponsoring school shall 
have, in addition to the consent required under Section 53A-11-1210, 
specific parental or guardian permission for membership in a curricular club 
at another school; 
(b) (i) curricular clubs may require that prospective members try out based 
on objective criteria outlined in the application materials; and 
(ii) try-outs may not require activities that violate the provisions of this part 
and other applicable laws, rules, and policies.); 
id. at § 53A-11-1210 (provides: 
(1) A school shall require written parental or guardian consent for student 
participation in all curricular and noncurricular clubs at the school. 
(2) The consent described in Subsection (1) shall include an activity 
disclosure statement containing the following information: 
(a) the specific name of the club; 
(b) a statement of the club’s purpose, goals, and activities; 
(c) a statement of the club’s categorization, which shall be obtained from the 
application for authorization of a club in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 53A-11-1204 or 53A-11-1205, indicating all of the following that 
may apply: 
(i) athletic; 
(ii) business/economic; 
(iii) agriculture; 
(iv) art/music/performance; 
(v) science; 
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tackles the central question of whether requiring parental notification and 
permission prior to students joining school clubs or organizations, such 
as the Gay Straight Alliance (“GSA”)5, the Bible Club, or other 
viewpoint or content-related activities, violates the First Amendment’s 
freedom of speech provision6 or the EAA. 
At the outset, the article examines Georgia’s statute mandating 
parental consent for participation in clubs, its impetus, and its legislative 
history. This section uses Georgia’s parental consent for participation 
statute as a proxy to examine similar state and local policies. Next, the 
article reviews the EAA, the First Amendment, and case law involving 
parent’s fundamental rights to direct and control the education of their 
children. This section discusses two relevant decisions—the Eleventh 
and Third Circuits split on the constitutionality of whether a parental 
notification or consent requirement for students to opt-out of the Pledge 
of Allegiance and other “patriotic” activities is required. Finally, this 
article analyzes the legality of the Georgia “parental consent for clubs” 
statute under the EAA and the First Amendment, concluding that it, and 
similar parental consent for participation policies, violates the EAA and 
could unconstitutionally infringe on students’ First Amendment rights. 
                                                                                                             
(vi) gaming; 
(vii) religious; 
(viii) community service/social justice; and 
(ix) other; 
(d) beginning and ending dates; 
(e) a tentative schedule of the club activities with dates, times, and places 
specified; 
(f) personal costs associated with the club, if any; 
(g) the name of the sponsor, supervisor, or monitor who is responsible for 
the club; and 
(h) any additional information considered important for the students and 
parents to know. 
(3) All completed parental consent forms shall be filed by the parent or the 
club’s sponsor, supervisor, or monitor with the school’s principal, the chief 
administrative officer of a charter school, or their designee.); 
see also, Kate Royal, Proposed LGBT club prompts new Rankin school policy, THE 
CLARION-LEDGER, Jan. 15, 2015, available at http://www.clarionledger.com/ 
story/news/local/2015/01/14/rankin-schools-gay-club-policy/21745481/ (a report by the 
Clarion Ledger newspaper about a 2015 policy modification by the Rankin County 
School Board in Mississippi that adopted a parental consent policy for students to 
participate in clubs with the alleged intention to prevent students from joining gay-
straight alliance type clubs). 
 5 See What is a GSA?, GSANETWORK, https://www.gsanetwork.org/resources/ 
building-your-gsa/what-gsa (last visited Sept. 7 2015). 
 6 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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GEORGIA’S STATUTE REQUIRING PARENTAL CONSENT FOR 
STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN CLUBS 
In the mid-2000s, the Georgia legislature enacted a law codifying a 
long-standing school district practice requiring students to obtain 
parental consent prior to participation in clubs, organizations, sports, and 
other extracurricular activities.7 While not dispositive of a statute’s 
constitutionality,8 understanding its impetus and legislative history, 
including the motivations of the legislator(s) who introduced the 
legislation, sometimes foreshadows whether a court will uphold the 
statute or find it unconstitutional.9 
The Statute, as Codified, Requires Parental Consent for a 
Student’s Participation in Clubs and Organizations Sponsored by 
the School 
In 2006, after many drafts, committee reports, and amendments, the 
Georgia General Assembly adopted Senate Bill 413, “Parental consent 
for participation in school clubs and organizations.”10 The bill was 
codified as the Official Code of Georgia Section 20-2-705.11 The Bill 
provides: 
(a) As used in this Code section, the term: 
(1) “Clubs and organizations” means clubs and 
organizations comprised of students who wish to 
organize and meet for common goals, objectives, or 
purposes and which is directly under the sponsorship, 
direction, and control of the school. This term shall 
include any activities reasonably related to such clubs 
and organizations, but shall not include competitive 
interscholastic activities or events. 
(2) “Competitive interscholastic activity” means 
functions held under the auspices or sponsorship of a 
                                                                                                             
 7 Ga. Code § 20-2-705 (2006). 
 8 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 
102, 108 (1980) (“We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the 
starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a 
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be 
regarded as conclusive.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (utilizing the 
text alongside the history and background of a school board prayer policy to determine its 
constitutionality). 
 10 Ga. SB 413 (2006). 
 11 Ga. Code § 20-2-705 (2006). 
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school that involves its students in competition between 
individuals or groups representing two or more schools. 
This term shall include cheerleading, band, and chorus. 
(b) Each local board of education shall include in the 
student code of conduct distributed annually at the 
beginning of each school year pursuant to Code Section 
20-2-736 information regarding school clubs and 
organizations. Such information shall include without 
limitation the name of the club or organization, mission 
or purpose of the club or organization, name of the club’s 
or organization’s faculty advisor, and a description of 
past or planned activities. On the form included in the 
student code of conduct, as required in Code Section 20-
2-751.5, the local board of education shall provide an 
area for a parent or legal guardian to decline permission 
for his or her student to participate in a club or 
organization designated by him or her. 
(c) For clubs or organizations started during the school year, 
the local board of education shall require written permission 
from a parent or guardian prior to a student’s participation.12 
The language ultimately adopted by both houses and signed by the 
governor, however, was not a part of SB 413 as introduced.13 It was not 
until Georgia Senator Nancy Schaefer proposed a second amendment to 
the bill, including language similar to the final draft that the parental 
consent provision became part of SB 413.14 As discussed below, Senator 
Schaefer was particularly interested, on behalf of her White County 
constituents, in the adoption of a parental consent for clubs statute.15 
                                                                                                             
 12 Ga. SB 413 (2006). 
 13 The Compulsory School Attendance Law, S.B. 413, 2006 Sess. (Ga. 2006), 
available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/display/20052006/SB/413 
(introduced, Jan. 12, 2006, without the parental consent requirement, by Senators Moody 
of the 56th, Weber of the 40th, Douglas of the 17th, Thomas of the 2nd, Fort of the 39th, 
and others; signed by governor on May 5, 2006) 
 14 Compare id. with SB 413, 2006 Sess. (Ga. 2006), Floor Amend. I AM 33 0426 
available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20052006/58338.pdf (amendment 
offered by Senators Schaefer of the 50th, Rogers of the 21st, Williams of the 19th, and 
Seabaugh of the 28th) 
 15 See infra note 45. 
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White County P.R.I.D.E. v. Board of Education of White County: 
Conflict over a Gay/Straight Alliance Student Group 
White County is a small county in the northeast Georgia mountains, 
primarily comprised of Cleveland, the birthplace of the Cabbage Patch 
Kids, and Helen, a “Bavarian” tourist town chock full of Christmas 
stores, candy stores, and arts and crafts galore.16 The White County 
school board is located in Cleveland, as is the only high school in the 
White County Public School System (White County High School).17 All 
totaled, White County schools have approximately 3,700 students 
between the High School (grades 9–12), the Ninth Grade Academy 
(grade 9), the Middle School (grades 6–8), the Intermediate School 
(grades 3–5), two elementary schools (grades K-5), and a primary school 
(grades K-2).18 
In January 2005, a student plaintiff met with the new principal of 
White County High School ( “WCHS”) to request recognition of a 
GSA.19 She submitted her request in writing, stating that she wished to 
form a GSA to “create a ‘safe ground’ for lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
transgender students who experienced bullying at school.”20 The 
principal denied the request at first, but later informed plaintiff students 
that they could form the GSA if they provided the principal with a list of 
proposed members and by-laws.21 The principal did not require any other 
noncurricular student group to comply with these requirements prior to 
school recognition.22 
In the meantime, the White County community began to protest the 
GSA formation.23 Several students wore t-shirts with opposition 
messages printed on them. Other students pushed the envelope by 
requesting formation of a “Redneck Club,” a “Wiccan Club,” and a 
                                                                                                             
 16 See WHITE COUNTY GEORGIA, http://whitecounty.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2015); 
Visiting White County, WHITE COUNTY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.aboutnorthgeorgia.com/ang/White_County (last visited Sept. 7, 2015). 
 17 See WHITE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, White County Schools, Board of Education, 
available at http://www.white.k12.ga.us/?DivisionID=9933&ToggleSideNav= (last 
modified Mar. 21, 2013). 
 18 WHITE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, White County Schools, available at 
http://www.white.k12.ga.us/ (last modified Mar. 21, 2013). 
 19 White Cnty. High Sch. Peers Rising in Diverse Educ. v. White Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
2006 WL 1991990 at *1 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2006). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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“Southern Heritage Club.”24 Notably, under the EAA, any of these clubs 
should be approved in the absence of disruption to the school.25 
To appease the school, the GSA adopted the name “Peers Rising in 
Diverse Education” (“PRIDE”) and altered the group’s mission statement 
to accommodate bullying or harassment of any student for any reason.26 
In late March 2005, the school formally recognized PRIDE and the group 
met on campus three times during the remainder of the 2004-2005 school 
year.27 
In March 2005, the White County board of education created the 
clubs and organizations committee, which recommended elimination of 
all noncurricular-related clubs and organizations.28 The board of 
education adopted those the recommendation.29 Accordingly, the WCHS 
principal reviewed the existing clubs and organizations, disbanding those 
he considered “noncurricular-related.”30 The disbanded clubs included 
the Fellowship of Christian Athletes (“FCA”), the Key Club, the Interact 
Club, and PRIDE.31 
However, the school did not disband the Student Council, the 
Youth Advisory Council (“YAC”), the Shotgun Club, the Beta Club, a 
prayer group, the Dance Team, and the Prom Group.32 As discussed 
below, the existence of these noncurricular-related clubs on school 
campus invoke the EAA, thereby requiring the school to give access to 
all noncurricular-related clubs.33 Because the school did not give equal 
access to PRIDE as it did the other noncurricular-related clubs, it denied 
the club equal access and a fair opportunity to conduct meetings on 
school premises under the EAA.34 
Accordingly, on July 14, 2006, the court enjoined White County 
School Board and WCHS from: (1) denying students of PRIDE equal 
access or fair opportunity to conduct a meeting on school premises 
during non-instructional time; and (2) discriminating against student 
groups on the basis of religious, political, philosophical, or other content 
of their speech.35 
                                                                                                             
 24 Id. 
 25 White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990 at *3. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at *2. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990 at * 2. 
 32 Id. at *4. 
 33 Id. at *3–4, 13–14. 
 34 Id. at * 13–14. 
 35 Id. 
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White County Legislators Push for a Parental Consent Provision 
During the course of the White County PRIDE litigation, White 
County Senator Nancy Schaefer and others were working to find another 
route to preclude students from joining PRIDE or any other GSA.36 In 
fact, prior to Senator Schaefer’s introduction of Senate Bill 14937 
(“School/Extracurricular Activities; written notification; withhold 
permission”), in February 2005 she stated, “she believes many parents 
need to be involved in deciding what school activities their children 
attend, especially those involving sexuality.”38 
Senate Bill 149 (and accompanying House Bill 661) did not go 
forward during the 2005 General Assembly.39 However, in exchange for 
pursuing the law, legislators put the pressure on the Department of 
Education to pass a rule containing the “parental consent for clubs” 
mandate.40 Plaintiffs in the already-filed White County PRIDE case were 
concerned with the implementation of such a rule.41 Regarding the 
impetus for the rule and response to PRIDE, one plaintiff’s father stated, 
“[a] lot of children are afraid . . . . That’s one of the problems. 
Orientation is not something you choose. Being gay is an orientation. 
And a lot of parents don’t understand.”42 Another plaintiff commented on 
the parental consent requirement, “I know kids, they’ve told things to 
their parents, and they’ve pretty much kicked them out of the house . . . . 
Some people won’t say anything to their parents.”43 
                                                                                                             
 36 Brandon Larrabee, Schools’ gay-straight clubs feel targeted by new Board of 
Education proposal; Rule would require students to get their parents’ permission before 
joining select organizations, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, May 31, 2005, at A-1 (Senator 
Schaefer tried to dispute the rule’s targeting gay-straight alliances, stating that “some 
parents might not want their children involved in more than two or three clubs at the 
same time, though she concede[d] that the White County controversy added some 
immediacy to the issue.”); Dyana Bagby, Schools weigh parental permission policies; 
Districts urged to act before state mandates rules for student clubs, SOUTHERN VOICE 
ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2006), (this source in no longer available online, but a hard copy of the 
online newspaper is on file with the author). (Additionally, as reported in Southern Voice 
Online in January 2006, Senator Schaefer said publicly “she opposes gay-straight 
alliances.”). 
 37 Ga. SB 149 (2005), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/Display/20052006/SB/149. 
 38 Brian Basinger, Bill calls for parent consent in school activities; Opponents say 
measure puts undue burden on school staff, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Feb. 10, 2005, at B-5. 
 39 Ga. SB 142 (2005); Ga. HB 661 (2005), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/ 
legislation/en-US/Display/20052006/HB/661. 
 40 Mary MacDonald, Rule aimed at gay clubs would make all students get approval, 
THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Mar. 18, 2005, at 1D. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
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At a hearing before the Georgia Department of Education, Senator 
Schaefer testified, “[c]hildren today are swimming in a sea of drugs and 
pornography and violence and abortion, and we can go on and on and on. 
Children in high school cannot be expected to make lifetime decisions.”44 
Despite the State Superintendent’s support and months of delays, 
committee re-writes, and debate,45 the Georgia Board of Education 
rejected the rule in a 10-3 vote.46 
Nancy Schaefer and other supporters did not wait long to 
reintroduce the parental consent bill in the State Senate.47 When Senate 
Bill 413 came before the Senate in January 2006, it did not contain any 
reference to the parental consent provision.48 However, in a Floor 
Amendment, Senator Schaefer inserted the language almost exactly as 
codified in existing law.49 Despite attempts by the Georgia School 
Board’s Association to “stave off” the Parental Consent Bill,50 and 
throughout reviews by both the Senate and the House education 
                                                                                                             
 44 Brandon Larrabee, Club proposal called discriminatory, The Augusta Chronicle, 
Apr. 14, 2005, at B06 available at http://old.chronicle.augusta.com/stories/2005/ 
04/14/met_450257.shtml. 
 45 Brandon Larrabee, Hot debate delays vote on school club consent; Critics: Plan 
hurts gay-straight groups, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Apr. 15, 2005, at B-1; Brandon 
Larrabee, It’s club rule vs. children’s freedom at Board of Education hearing; Rule would 
require parental permission to take part in extracurricular organizations, FLORIDA TIMES-
UNION, June 9, 2005, at A-1; Mary MacDonald, School clubs’ parental OK due for vote, 
THE ALTANTA JOURNAL-CONST., June 9, 2005, at 1C; Mary MacDonald, Looking ahead: 
Decision Tuesday; State school board to vote on parental permission for students joining 
organizations, THE ALTANTA JOURNAL-CONST., June 12, 2005, at Northside, 11ZH. 
 46 Brandon Larrabee, Club permission rule rejected, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, June 
15, 2005, at B01; Paul Donsky, Board rejects rule to require parental OK for school 
clubs, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., June 15, 2005, at 1D; Staff and Wire Report, 
Permission not needed to join clubs in schools, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, June 
19, 2005, at NG1; Staff, Parental permission not required, EDUC. WEEK, June 22, 2005, 
at p. 25, Vol. 24, No. 41. 
 47 See SB 413, 2006 Leg. Sess, Floor Amendment 1 (Ga. Feb. 2006). 
 48 Ga. L. 2006, p. 851, § 4/SB 413 (introduced, Jan. 12, 2006, without the parental 
consent requirement, by Senators Moody of the 56th, Weber of the 40th, Douglas of the 
17th, Thomas of the 2nd, Fort of the 39th, and others; signed by governor on May 5, 
2006). 
 49 SB 413, 2006 Leg. Sess, Floor Amendment 1 (Ga. Feb. 2006) (amendment offered 
by Senators Schaefer of the 50th, Rogers of the 21st, Williams of the 19th, and Seabaugh 
of the 28th); see also Vicky Eckenrode, Democrat calls vote for school bill abrupt, THE 
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Jan. 25, 2006, at B02, available at http://chronicle.augusta.com/ 
stories/2006/01/25/met_49153.shtml#.Ve4C8vZViko. 
 50 Dyana Bagby, Schools weigh parental permission policies; Districts urged to act 
before state mandates rules for student clubs, SOUTHERN VOICE ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2006), 
(source is no longer available online, but a hard copy is on file with the author). 
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committees, the Senate passed the bill.51 Governor Sonny Perdue signed 
the legislation in May 2006.52 The Bill became effective July 1, 2006.53 
To date, no parties have filed a lawsuit on the basis of the statute;54 
however, it is just a matter of time. The statute, for many reasons, is an 
unconstitutional violation of students’ First Amendment rights and of the 
EAA.55 
PARENTAL CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
STUDENT CLUBS VIOLATE THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT 
The Equal Access Act 
In 1984, Congress enacted the EAA on the basis of anecdotal 
evidence that, despite the protections students enjoyed under the First 
Amendment as set forth above, “secondary school students suffered 
discrimination at the hands of school administrators, sanctioned by 
federal district courts, who believed that the First Amendment precluded 
equal access for religious student groups to the public school.”56 The 
                                                                                                             
 51 Ga. SB 413 (2005). 
 52 GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY LEGISLATION, 2005-2006 Regular Session - SB 413 
Compulsory School Attendance Law; exemptions; provide local board of education 
policies; minimum annual attendance; change provisions, Status History, available at 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20052006/SB/413. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See generally, GA State Court dockets. 
 55 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 56 Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1078-1079 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 130 CONG. 
REC. S8331 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch)), cert. denied 540 U.S. 
813 (2003) (As further explained in the Senate Report, The standard of ‘equal access’ 
was used by the Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent, to describe the free speech 
principle safeguarded by Section 2(a). In Section 2(a), as in the Supreme Court decision, 
the guarantee of equal access means that religiously oriented student activities of an 
extracurricular nature would be allowed under the same terms and conditions as other 
extracurricular activities. Under Section 2(a), it would be unlawful to single out a 
voluntary student religious activity for discriminatory treatment based on the fact that the 
form or content of its expression is religious. The opportunity for an extracurricular 
religious group to meet and have access to public school facilities could not be restricted 
solely because the activity included religious speech or prayer. This provision follows the 
Supreme Court decision in Widmar v. Vincent, which held that religious speech is 
entitled to the same First Amendment protections as non-religious speech.); S. Rep. No. 
98-357, at 38-39 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2384-85 (cited by Prince 
v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1080-1081 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 540 U.S. 813 (2003)) 
(As noted in Prince v. Jacoby, supra, at 1081, n.1, “Senate Report 98-357 was written by 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany the committee’s favorable 
recommendation to the Senate of Senate Bill 1059, a proposed Equal Access Act.  See S. 
Rep. No. 98-357, at 1. Although Senate Bill 1059 was not the bill that ultimately became 
the Equal Access Act, much of the Act was derived from Senate Bill 1059, and the 
Senate report accompanying that bill is relevant to our analysis.”). 
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legislative history of the EAA “makes it clear that the purpose of the Act 
was to confirm students’ rights to freedom of speech, freedom of 
association, and free exercise of religion.”57 The legislative history also 
reveals that the main purpose of the EAA was to “address student 
involvement in religious activities during extracurricular periods of the 
school day.”58 
As enacted, however, the Act differs from the original bill because 
it concerns religious, political, philosophical, and other activities.59 Since 
its inception, the EAA has been applied in cases involving Bible clubs,60 
other Christian clubs,61 and—in the most recent and controversial 
cases—GSA62 or other similar clubs.63 
                                                                                                             
 57 White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990 at *12 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-710; S. Rep. No. 
98-357). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at *12 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (schools cannot discriminate against student 
groups based on “the religious, political, philosophical, or other content” of the group’s 
speech)). 
 60 See, e.g., Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (the EAA’s effects 
of allowing Bible club on school campus does not violate the Establishment Clause); 
Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 540 U.S. 813 (2003) 
(preclusion of Bible Club violated EAA); Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 
F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003) (preclusion of Bible Club violated EAA). 
 61 See, e.g., ALIVE v. Farmington Pub. Schs, 2007 WL 2572023 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 5, 
2007) (holding that preclusion of the Christian group ALIVE violated EAA); Westfield 
High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 62 See, e.g., Gay-Straight Alliance of Yulee High School v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau 
County, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (preliminarily enjoining school district 
from declining recognition of GSA); Gay-Straight Alliance of Okeechobee High Sch. v. 
School Bd. of Okeechobee County, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that 
the GSA’s purpose was to promote tolerance and equality among students, regardless of 
sexual orientation); 483 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (court granted GSA’s request 
for preliminary injunction and ordered school board to officially recognize the GSA with 
the privileges granted to other school clubs); 242 F.R.D. 644 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2007) 
(granting protective order for discovery); 571 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (permanently enjoining 
school board “from denying equal access and recognition to the GSA at OHS as a 
noncurricular student group which shall be afforded all rights and privileges granted to 
other noncurricular student groups”); Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 2003 WL 
22670934 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2003); 311 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding 
that the entire subject matter of sexual activity was banned at the school, that the 
information on the group’s web site was lewd and offensive, the group’s existence and 
message created a material and substantial interference with the district’s educational 
mission, and therefore preclusion was not based on the group’s viewpoint); Boyd County 
High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance (GSA) v. Board of Educ. of Boyd County, 258 F. Supp. 
2d 667 (E.D. Ky 2003) (court enjoined school board to give GSA equal status as other 
student groups); Colin by and through Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 
1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that existence of other noncurriculum-related clubs 
established limited open forum and preclusion of GSA violated EAA); East High 
Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1356 
(D. Utah 1998) (holding that the school did not have any “noncurriculum related” clubs 
and the EAA did not apply); 81 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Utah 1999) (finding that the 
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The Equal Access Act (“EAA”) provides as follows: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which 
receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited 
open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or 
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting 
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, 
political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such 
meetings. 
. . . . 
(c) Fair opportunity criteria. Schools shall be deemed to 
offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a 
meeting within its limited open forum if such school 
uniformly provides that – 
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated; 
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the 
school, 
the government, or its agents or employees; 
. . .  and 
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, 
control, 
                                                                                                             
school’s accommodation of only curriculum related clubs does not result in viewpoint 
discrimination against GSA); 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that “if” 
another noncurriculum related club existed at the school, then precluding the GSA would 
violate the EAA); 1999 WL 1390255 (D. Utah Nov. 30, 1999) (court dismissed plaintiffs’ 
second amended complaint for injunctive relief because defendant’s resounding 
affirmation that “gay-positive” viewpoints could be freely expressed in curriculum-
related student groups, coupled with the fact that no student was reprimanded for 
expression of “gay positive” views, dispelled any inference that an unwritten policy 
forbade “gay-positive” views). 
 63 See, e.g., Straights and Gays for Equality (SAGE) v. Osseo Area Schs, Dist. No. 
279, 2006 WL 983904 (D. Minn. Apr. 4, 2006) (granting SAGE’s motion for preliminary 
injunction and holding that preclusion of SAGE, when school has at least nine other 
noncurricular groups, violates EAA); 2006 WL 890754 (D. Minn. Apr. 6, 2006) (denying 
school district’s motion to temporarily stay the order of April 4, 2006); 471 F.3d 908 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (upholding district court’s order granting SAGE’s motion for preliminary 
injunction); 2007 WL 2885810 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2007) (court grants SAGE’s motion 
for partial summary judgment, holding that preclusion of SAGE, when school has at least 
nine other noncurricular groups, violates EAA), aff’d by 540 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 2008). 
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or regularly attend activities of student groups. 
(d) Construction of title [20 USCS §§ 4071 et seq.] with 
respect to certain rights. Nothing in this title [20 USCS 
§§ 4071 et seq.] shall be construed to authorize the 
United States or any State or political subdivision 
thereof- 
. . . . 
(7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any person.64 
The three factors triggering application of the EAA are, (1) a public 
secondary school that (2) receives federal funding, and (3) has 
established a “limited open forum” by allowing other “noncurricular 
related” student groups to meet on school premises.65 
The EAA guarantees secondary school students the right to 
voluntarily participate in noncurricular66 groups dedicated to religious, 
                                                                                                             
 64 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2007) (emphasis supplied) (The Act defines “limited open 
forum” as follows: “A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such 
school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student 
groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time” id.; additionally, the 
Equal Access Act prohibits school employees from: 
(1)  to influence the form or content of any prayer or other 
religious activity; 
(2)  to require any person to participate in prayer or other religious 
activity; 
(3)  to expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing 
the space for student-initiated meetings; 
(4)  to compel any school agent or employee to attend a school 
meeting if the content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to the beliefs 
of the agent or employee; 
(5)  to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful; 
(6)  to limit the rights of groups of students which are not of a 
specified numerical size  . . . ). 
 65 Prince, 303 F.3d at 1079 (cert. denied 540 U.S. 813 (2003)). 
 66 See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2007) (Whether a club is “curriculum-related” or 
“noncurriculum” related is debatable. In Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 
240, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990), Justice O’Connor defined “curriculum related” as: (1) if the 
subject matter of the group is actually taught or will soon be taught, in a regularly offered 
course; “a French club would directly relate to the curriculum if a school taught French in 
a regularly offered course or planned to teach the subject in the near future”; (2) if the 
subject matter of the group concerns the body of courses as a whole – “A school’s student 
government would generally relate directly to the curriculum to the extent that it 
addresses concerns, solicits opinions, and formulates proposals pertaining to the body of 
courses offered by the school”; (3) if participation in the group is required for a particular 
course – “If participation in a school’s band or orchestra were required for the band or 
orchestra classes”; or (4) if participation in the group results in academic credit – “If 
participation in a school’s band or orchestra . . . resulted in academic credit, then those 
groups would also directly relate to the curriculum.” 
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political, philosophical, or other expressive activities protected by the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.67 The EAA defines 
the term “secondary school” with reference to state law to determine 
what grade levels are covered by the Act.68 Undoubtedly, the EAA 
applies to students in high school; the question generally arises regarding 
state law’s treatment of middle school or “junior high” school and 
whether these are considered “secondary schools.”69 Once a school is 
deemed to be a “secondary school,” the EAA applies when the school 
gives at least one noncurriculum-related student group (e.g., the Beta 
Club or Fellowship of Christian Athletes) access to its facilities, 
equipment, or the like during non-instructional time.70 
Notably, for this article there are two provisions in the EAA. First, 
the Act states that schools are deemed to offer a “fair opportunity” to 
students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if 
such school uniformly provides that the meeting is voluntary and 
student-initiated and that “nonschool persons [do] not direct, conduct, 
control, or regularly attend activities of student groups.”71 To be 
voluntary and student-initiated, the individual student must make the 
decision to initiate or join the club.72 The EAA does not provide that 
students must obtain parental permission to initiate or join clubs; to do so 
                                                                                                             
  The Mergens court specifically rejected the argument that “‘curriculum related’ 
means anything remotely related to abstract educational goals,” such as “promoting 
effective citizenship.”  Mergens at 240. The required relationship depends much more on 
the specific course’s subject matter compared with the activities of a specific group. “The 
difficult question,” stated Justice O’Connor, “is the degree of ‘unrelatedness to the 
curriculum’ required for a group to be considered ‘noncurriculum related.’” Id. 
  Some courts interpret “curriculum related” strictly.  See, e.g., Pope v. East 
Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “curriculum-related” 
clubs are the obvious groups, such as the math team.  Other courts, however, go to great 
strides to classify the school’s clubs as “curriculum-related.”  For instance, in East High 
Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 
(D. Utah 1999), the court held that the Odyssey of the Mind, Future Business Leaders of 
America, Future Homemakers of America, and the National Honor Society were 
“curriculum-related.”  The attempt to classify all student groups as “curriculum-related” 
is important because, if the school does not have any noncurricular related clubs, then the 
EAA is not invoked.  (The First Amendment’s general prescription against discrimination 
on the bases of content or viewpoint still would apply.)) 
 67 Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 68 See 20 U.S.C. § 4072 (2007) (“As used in this subchapter – The term ‘secondary 
school’ means a public school which provides secondary education as determined by 
State law.”). 
 69 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2007). 
 70 See id. (the plain meaning of the term “noninstructional time” under the EAA 
includes meetings during lunchtime); see Ceniceros by and through Risser v. Board of 
Trustees, 106 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 71 20 U.S.C.A. § 4071(c). 
 72 See id. 
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would be contrary to the voluntariness and student-initiation provisions 
set forth in the Act.73 Furthermore, the EAA’s mandate against the 
involvement of nonschool persons specifically prohibits parents of 
students from directing, conducting, controlling, or regularly attending 
activities of student groups.74 
The Equal Access Act and Gay Straight Alliance Groups 
Students desiring to initiate groups such as the GSA, or other such 
tolerance groups, have inundated the courts with claims under the 
EAA.75 Generally, courts have held that, if a school contains at least one 
noncurriculum-related club, then it must accommodate the GSA with the 
same access afforded to other school clubs.76 While the focus of this 
                                                                                                             
 73 See id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See, e.g., White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990. 
 76 See, e.g., Gay-Straight Alliance of Okeechobee High Sch. v. School Bd. of 
Okeechobee County, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (finding that the GSA’s 
purpose was to promote tolerance and equality among students, regardless of sexual 
orientation); 483 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (court granted GSA’s request for 
preliminary injunction and ordered school board to officially recognize the GSA with the 
privileges granted to other school clubs); 242 F.R.D. 644 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2007) 
(granting protective order for discovery); 571 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (permanently enjoining 
school board “from denying equal access and recognition to the GSA at OHS as a 
noncurricular student group which shall be afforded all rights and privileges granted to 
other noncurricular student groups”); Straights and Gays for Equality (SAGE) v. Osseo 
Area Schs, Dist. No. 279, 2006 WL 983904 (D. Minn. Apr. 4, 2006) (granting SAGE’s 
motion for preliminary injunction and holding that preclusion of SAGE, when school has 
at least nine other noncurricular groups, violates EAA); 2006 WL 890754 (D. Minn. Apr. 
6, 2006) (denying school district’s motion to temporarily stay the order of April 4, 2006); 
471 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding district court’s order granting SAGE’s motion 
for preliminary injunction); 2007 WL 2885810 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2007) (court grants 
SAGE’s motion for partial summary judgment, holding that preclusion of SAGE, when 
school has at least nine other noncurricular groups, violates EAA); Boyd County High 
Sch. Gay Straight Alliance (GSA) v. Board of Educ. of Boyd County, 258 F. Supp. 2d 
667 (E.D. Ky 2003) (court enjoined school board to give GSA equal status as other 
student groups); Colin by and through Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 
1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that existence of other noncurriculum-related clubs 
established limited open forum and preclusion of GSA violated EAA); but see, Caudillo 
v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 2003 WL 22670934 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2003); 311 F. 
Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that the entire subject matter of sexual activity 
was banned at the school, that the information on the group’s web site was lewd and 
offensive, the group’s existence and message created a material and substantial 
interference with the district’s educational mission, and therefore preclusion was not 
based on the group’s viewpoint); East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Board of Educ. of 
Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (D. Utah 1998) (holding that the school 
did not have any “noncurriculum related” clubs and the EAA did not apply); 81 F. Supp. 
2d 1199 (D. Utah 1999) (finding that the school’s accommodation of only curriculum 
related clubs does not result in viewpoint discrimination against GSA); 81 F. Supp. 2d 
1166 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that “if” another noncurriculum related club existed at the 
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article is not the application of the EAA to GSA-type clubs, it is 
important to understand the sometimes-hostile political climate in which 
GSA or similar clubs seek formation.77 Furthermore, court decisions 
holding that local school boards may not preclude these GSA-type clubs 
from formation without violating the EAA,78 have resulted in state 
legislation or local policies attempting to limit membership to GSA by 
requiring parental permission to join.79 
The Georgia “Parental Consent to Clubs” Statutes Conflicts with 
Language in the Equal Access Act 
Before considering the constitutionality of Georgia’s “parental 
consent to clubs” statute, we must address the incompatibility of the 
statutory language between the Georgia statute and the EAA. 
Specifically, the Georgia statute requires parental consent for “[c]lubs 
and organizations,” which “means clubs and organizations comprised of 
students who wish to organize and meet for common goals, objectives, or 
purposes and which is [sic] directly under the sponsorship, direction, and 
control of the school.”80 However, the EAA states that “[s]chools shall be 
deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a 
meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides 
that . . . there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the 
government, or its agents or employees . . . .”81  Per the EAA, 
“‘sponsorship’ includes the act of promoting, leading, or participating in 
a meeting. The assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other school 
employee to a meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute 
sponsorship of the meeting.”82 “The term ‘meeting’ includes those 
                                                                                                             
school, then precluding the GSA would violate the EAA); 1999 WL 1390255 (D. Utah 
Nov. 30, 1999) (court dismissed plaintiffs’ second amended complaint for injunctive 
relief because defendant’s resounding affirmation that “gay-positive” viewpoints could 
be freely expressed in curriculum-related student groups, coupled with the fact that no 
student was reprimanded for expression of “gay positive” views, dispelled any inference 
that an unwritten policy forbade “gay-positive” views). 
 77 See, e.g., GEORGIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY LEGISLATION, 2005-2006 Regular Session 
- SB 413 Compulsory School Attendance Law; exemptions; provide local board of 
education policies; minimum annual attendance; change provisions, Status History, 
available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/Display/20052006/SB/413; SB 
413, 2006 Sess. (Ga. 2006), Floor Amend. I AM 33 0426 available at 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20052006/58338.pdf. 
 78 See, e.g., White Cnty., 2006 WL 1991990. (litigation which gave rise to the 
insertion of the “parental consent to student clubs” language into already-existing SB 413 
by Georgia Senator Nancy Schaefer, who represents White County). 
 79 See id. 
 80 O.C.G. § 20-2-705 (a)(1) (2006) (emphasis supplied). 
 81 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (c)(2) (emphasis supplied). 
 82 20 U.S.C. § 4072. 
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activities of student groups which are permitted under a school’s limited 
open forum and are not directly related to the school curriculum.”83 
The EAA trumps all conflicting state legislation.84 Under the 
Georgia statute, only clubs and organizations “directly under the 
sponsorship” of the school are subject to the parental consent 
requirement.85 Yet, since the EAA forbids school “sponsorship” of a 
noncurricular student club, then any noncurriculum-related student club 
(i.e., one which the school shall not sponsor without violating the EAA) 
cannot be subject to the Georgia parental consent statute.86 In other 
words, noncurriculum-related clubs and organizations (such as the GSA 
and Bible clubs),87 which, per the EAA, cannot be sponsored by the 
school, are not subject to the Georgia parental consent statute, which 
applies to clubs or organizations sponsored by the school.88 Accordingly, 
applying the Georgia parental consent statute to any noncurriculum-
related club would violate the EAA.89 
PARENTAL CONSENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
STUDENT CLUBS MAY VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Students’ First Amendment Rights to Free Speech and Expression at 
School 
To fully deconstruct and analyze the constitutionality of the 
Georgia “parental consent to clubs” statute, it is necessary to review 
several tenets of the First Amendment law, and how these are applied to 
students in public schools. The First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”90 
                                                                                                             
 83 20 U.S.C. § 4072. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Compare id. with U.S. CONST. amend. I. (in addition to the constraints placed on 
school-sponsorship of student clubs in the EAA, schools may not affirmatively sponsor 
Bible clubs or other religious clubs (although they must accommodate them) in order to 
avoid the appearance of establishing or endorsing religion in contravention of the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause) 
 88 20 U.S.C. § 4071. 
 89 Id. 
 90 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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The First Amendment applies to all “people,” thus, students do not 
“shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”91 The Court has held that religious worship and 
discussion “are forms of speech and association protected by the First 
Amendment.”92 Additionally, “[t]he First Amendment protects 
[individuals’] right[s] not only to advocate their cause, but also to select 
what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.”93 
Accordingly, the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to join 
groups and associate with others holding similar beliefs.94 Justice Powell 
has written, “[a] stereotypical reaction to particular characteristics of a 
disfavored group cannot justify discriminatory legislation.95 It is 
nevertheless important to remember that the First Amendment protects 
an individual’s right to entertain unsound and unpopular beliefs . . . and 
to expound those beliefs publicly . . . [f]resh air and open discussion are 
better cures for vicious prejudice than are secrecy and dissembling.”96 
In the seminal case West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette, Justice Frankfurter wrote: 
[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that 
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will 
disintegrate the social organization. . . .We can have intellectual 
individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional 
minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. 
When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with 
here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to 
things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of 
freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that 
touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, 
they do not now occur to us.97 
                                                                                                             
 91 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1967). 
 92 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981). 
 93 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government Pac, 528 U.S. 377, 417 n.5, 120 S. Ct. 897 
(2000) (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988)). 
 94 Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 163-64, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1096–97 (1992) 
(citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, (1958)). 
 95 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 648 n.31 (1982) (citing, e. g., Mathews v. Lucas, 
427 U.S. 495, 520–521 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 96 Id. at 648 . 
 97 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1943) (court 
held that the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute—a form of 
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Long after the Barnette decision, the Supreme Court has had 
several occasions to scrutinize the speech and association rights of 
students.98 The Court has stated “the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults 
in other settings.”99 The Court also has held that First Amendment rights 
“must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.’”100 
In its examination of student speech rights and limitations, the 
Court held that a school may censor student speech if it reasonably 
threatens to materially and “substantially interfere with the work of the 
school or impinge upon the rights of other students.”101 To exercise this 
censorship, however, the school “must be able to show that its action was 
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”102 
Speech that is merely offensive to the listener does not constitute 
“imping[ing] on the rights of other students.”103 
Additionally, a school may regulate “plainly offensive” speech, or 
speech that is “sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd,” as part of its mission 
to instill those “fundamental values of ‘habits and manners of civility’ 
essential to a democratic society.”104 The Court explained that “[t]he 
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in 
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s 
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially-
appropriate behavior.”105 
Furthermore, a school may censor “school-sponsored” speech that 
is inconsistent with the school’s “basic educational mission.”106 The 
United States Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
explained, “[t]he question whether the First Amendment requires a 
                                                                                                             
utterance protected by the First Amendment—and pledge transcended constitutional 
limitations on their power and invaded the sphere of intellect and spirit which was the 
purpose of the First Amendment to reserve from all official control). 
 98 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988). 
 101 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 102 Id. (students wore black armbands to school in protest of Vietnam war; school 
could not censor the black armbands simply because it had an “undifferentiated fear” of 
classroom disruption). 
 103 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.); 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.5 (1988). 
 104 Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681, 683–84, (school allowed to ban sexually-suggestive 
student speech delivered to a “captive audience” of six hundred students in connection 
with a student government campaign). 
 105 Id. at 681. 
 106 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266. 
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school to tolerate particular student speech [i.e., the question addressed 
in Tinker] is different from the question whether the First Amendment 
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular speech.”107 The 
Court held, “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”108 Therefore, the Tinker 
decision controls a school’s ability to censor non-school-sponsored 
speech, while Hazelwood governs a school’s ability to regulate what “is 
in essence the school’s own speech, that is, articles that appear in a 
publication that is an official school organ.”109 
Parental Notification Provisions for Student Opt-Out of the Pledge of 
Allegiance: A Split in the Circuits 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality 
of requiring parental consent for a student to opt-out of the Pledge of 
Allegiance in Circle School v. Pappert.110 In Pappert, a Pennsylvania 
statute mandated that all public, private, and parochial schools within the 
Commonwealth display the United States flag in every classroom and 
provide for recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance or the National Anthem 
every school day.111 The Pennsylvania statute gave students the option of 
refraining from participation in reciting and saluting the flag on religious 
or personal grounds.112 It also required the school to notify, in writing, 
parents or guardians of those students who exercised the option of 
refraining from participation in reciting and saluting the flag.113 The 
Third Circuit held that the parental notification provision of the 
Pennsylvania statute violated students’ First Amendment right to free 
speech and was unconstitutional.114 The court found disturbing testimony 
by a Pennsylvania Representative’s testimony that, if a high school 
senior decided he did not want to say the Pledge of Allegiance, and if his 
parent would not give him permission to opt out, then the student could 
be compelled to say the Pledge and, further, could be disciplined for 
                                                                                                             
 107 Id. at 270–71 (emphasis added). 
 108 Id. at 273. 
 109 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2001) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 110 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004), aff’g The Circle School v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 
616 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
 111 Pappert, 381 F.3d at 174  (allowing private and parochial schools to opt out on 
religious grounds). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 174–175. 
 114 Id. at 174 (also holding that certain of the statute’s provisions violated private 
schools’ First Amendment right to free expressive association). 
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noncompliance.115 The court found convincing the plaintiff-student’s 
argument that the parental notification portion of the statute served as a 
deterrent to his exercise of free expression right not to participate in such 
recitation.116 Citing Tinker, the court reminded us that it “can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”117 The court 
then examined the student speech cases discussed above, including the 
Fraser, Hazelwood, and Barnette cases.118 
The court found that a parental notification provision “limited only 
to parents of students who refuse to engage in such recitation may have 
been purposefully drafted to ‘chill speech by providing a disincentive to 
opting out of [the Act].’”119 Indeed, the legislative history for the 
Pennsylvania Act provided “some evidence that such disincentive was 
indeed part of the Commonwealth’s motivation in adopting the parental 
notification scheme.”120 While acknowledging that one legislator’s 
motivation in drafting a statute is not dispositive, “the view of the 
legislator who introduced the bill sheds some light on its underlying 
motivation.”121 Citing the Supreme Court, the court reiterated 
“‘constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ 
effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition 
against the exercise of First Amendment rights.’”122 
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court’s characterization of 
the parental notification requirement as a “viewpoint-based regulation 
that operates to chill student speech,” and that this provision: 
cannot survive strict scrutiny required for such viewpoint 
discrimination because it is not the most narrowly tailored method to 
achieve the government’s interest in notifying the parents of the 
administration of the [statute], an interest that is, in any case, not 
sufficiently compelling to infringe on students’ free speech rights.123 
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The Pennsylvania parental notification provision “clearly 
discriminates among students based on the viewpoints they express; it is 
‘only triggered when a student exercises his or her First Amendment 
right not to [engage in recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance or national 
anthem or in flag salutation].’”124 Accordingly, the court struck down the 
provision as unconstitutional.125 
More recently, the District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida, in determining the constitutionality of a Florida statute, similar 
to the Pennsylvania notification act discussed above, held that, while a 
parent has a fundamental right to control the upbringing and direct the 
education of their children,126 this right “does not translate into a 
requirement that a parent must give prior approval of a child’s exercise 
of First Amendment rights in a school setting.”127 Accordingly, the court 
ruled that a Florida statute requiring parental consent to opt out of the 
Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutionally infringes upon students’ First 
Amendment rights.128 
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and 
reversed in part the district court’s decision. In reversing the district 
court’s holding that requiring parental consent for a student to opt-out of 
saying the Pledge, the Eleventh Circuit wrote: 
Although we accept that the government ordinarily may not compel 
students to participate in the Pledge, e.g., Barnette, 63 S. Ct. at 1187, we 
also recognize that a parent’s right to interfere with the wishes of his 
child is stronger than a public school official’s right to interfere on behalf 
of the school’s own interest.129 And this Court and others have routinely 
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acknowledged parents as having the principal role in guiding how their 
children will be educated on civic values.130 
We conclude that the State’s interest in recognizing and protecting 
the rights of parents on some educational issues is sufficient to justify the 
restriction of some students’ freedom of speech.  Even if the balance of 
parental, student, and school rights might favor the rights of a mature 
high school student in a specific instance, Plaintiff has not persuaded us 
that the balance favors students in a substantial number of instances—
particularly those instances involving elementary and middle school 
students—relative to the total number of students covered by the 
statute.131 
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the parent’s right to control 
her child’s upbringing132 outweighs the student’s First Amendment 
rights.133 In doing so, however, the court emphasized that it evaluated 
only the face of the statute, and not the statute as applied: “[t]o the 
degree that the district court’s judgment invalidates the ‘written request 
by . . . parent’ requirement of the Pledge Statute, the judgment is 
reversed. We stress that we decide and hint at nothing about the Pledge 
Statute’s constitutionality as applied to a specific student or a specific 
division of students.”134 
Policies Requiring Parental Consent for Participation in Clubs Infringe 
upon Students’ First Amendment Rights 
Students—particularly secondary school students—do not shed 
their constitutional rights to free speech and expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.135 None of the limitations on student speech, including 
the Tinker “substantial disruption” test, the Bethel lewd and offensive 
language test, nor the Hazelwood “school-sponsored speech” test applies 
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to the parental consent provision.136 As with spoken or written speech by 
students at school, students’ decisions to initiate or join a club clearly are 
protected by the First Amendment as free speech, free expression, and 
free association. While the Eleventh Circuit’s Fraser v. Winn decision 
“hinted” at its inclination when asked to weigh the rights of parents 
versus the First Amendment rights of students, it was very clear that the 
decision involved a very narrow holding about the facial constitutionality 
of the Florida pledge statute.137 Accordingly, the “jury is still out” in the 
Eleventh Circuit on whether the Georgia parental consent for 
participation statute, as applied to students such as those interested in 
joining a religious club, violates some students’ First Amendment 
rights.138 
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s holding, the Third Circuit held 
that requiring parental notification prior to a student’s opting out of 
saying the Pledge of Allegiance at school, has a chilling effect on their 
speech and violates their First Amendment rights.139 By analogy, 
requiring students to obtain parental consent to participate in clubs—
particularly clubs based on religious, philosophical, or political beliefs—
also has a chilling effect on their speech in violation of the First 
Amendment. Consider the student who holds a belief in Christianity, yet 
comes from a Muslim family. In parental-consent states and school 
divisions, this child would not be able to exercise her religious beliefs 
and religious speech rights to explore her Christian faith without gaining 
parental permission. Furthermore more, it would not matter if this child 
were eighteen years old. Under the Georgia (and similar) statutes, an 
eighteen-year-old student’s parent still must consent prior to her joining a 
club.140 As such, a parent can hinder the religious practice and religious 
speech of a student. 
Further, the Georgia statute cannot apply to religious clubs without 
running afoul of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. The 
Georgia statute requires parental consent for a student’s participation in 
clubs or organizations which are “directly under the sponsorship, 
direction, and control of the school.”141 The Establishment Clause 
prohibits schools from affirmatively sponsoring (promoting) religious 
clubs.142 Accordingly, the Georgia parental consent statute, which only 
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applies to those clubs or organizations directly sponsored, directed and 
controlled by the school, cannot apply to religious clubs because a school 
cannot sponsor, direct and control religious speech.143 As such, the mere 
act of applying Georgia parental consent requirements to student 
participation in religious clubs violates the Establishment Clause.144 
Therefore, Georgia schools may not subject student participation in 
religious organizations to the parental consent statute.145 
By logical extension, the effect of excluding only religious-based 
clubs from the Georgia statute (because applying the statute to religious 
clubs would suggest that the school directly sponsored, directed and 
controlled the religious club) would be favoring religious clubs.146 
Excluding Bible or religious clubs from parental consent, but not other 
clubs—such as the GSA—potentially discriminates against other clubs in 
favor of religious clubs in violation of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.147 In other words, requiring parental consent for all but 
religious clubs constitutes preference for religious clubs, which similarly 
violates the Establishment Clause and amounts to viewpoint 
discrimination against non-religious clubs (i.e., subjecting non-religious 
clubs to different standards than religious clubs).148 
A PARENT’S RIGHT TO DIRECT THE UPBRINGING OF HER 
CHILD DOES NOT JUSTIFY INFRINGEMENT ON STUDENTS’ 
RIGHTS 
Crucial to a parent’s position favoring a parental consent 
requirement for student participation in clubs is the assertion of the 
parent’s right to direct the education and upbringing of their child.149 
Importantly, courts have generally construed this right to protect a 
parent’s right to direct the religious education of his or her child.150 
While parents do have the right to direct and control the education and 
upbringing of their children, this right is not absolute and should not 
interfere, absent a compelling interest, with students’ exercise of First 
Amendment rights.151 Moreover, when this right conflicts with a school 
district’s curricular choices, so long as the district’s choices do not 
infringe upon another constitutional principle, the school district’s right 
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to select the curriculum trumps a parent’s right to direct the education of 
his or her child.152 
The issue here is whether a parent’s right to direct the religious 
education of his or her child, as exercised through parental non-consent 
for her child’s participation in a club, outweighs the student’s individual 
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment and the EAA even at the 
“schoolhouse gate.”153 The question may be closer if the state were 
requiring student participation in an activity in which the parent did not 
want his or her child to participate; yet, even in this circumstance, courts 
have held that parents do not have the right to opt their children out of 
curriculum and instruction even when the materials reference viewpoints 
inconsistent with the parents’ beliefs.154 Here, however, the student (at 
her own behest and not at the direction of the school) desires to express 
himself or herself through association with a particular club, yet the state 
only allows the student to join the club upon his parent’s permission.155 
Were the parent to withhold his or her consent for the student’s 
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participation, the parent would do so in contravention of the student’s 
viewpoint, placing a hindrance on the student’s otherwise-protected free 
speech and association rights.156 Moreover, since a parent’s rights to 
direct the education of his or her child does not trump a school district’s 
authority to set the curriculum, it seems unlikely that it would trump an 
individual student’s First Amendment rights that are protected through 
her associations and expressions at school. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, the author reviewed the Georgia “parental consent for 
clubs” statute, including the White County litigation over a proposed 
GSA and such litigation’s ties to the Georgia statute’s legislative 
history.157 The Georgia statute serves as a proxy for all similar state laws 
and local school district policies.158 This article has explored the current 
law on student speech, on the EAA as contrasted with the Georgia 
statute, and on two recent decisions regarding whether parental 
notification and consent requirements for students opting out of the 
Pledge were unconstitutional, viewpoint-based discrimination in 
violation of students’ First Amendment rights. In applying the 
aforementioned law to the Georgia statute (and similar state laws and 
school district policies), the author argues that requiring parental consent 
for a student to participate in a school-based (although, not necessarily 
school-sponsored or curriculum related) club violates students’ First 
Amendment rights. 
It is only a matter of time before some plaintiff challenges 
O.C.G.A. § 20-2-750 (or a similar law or policy, such as 70 Okla. St. § 
24-105 or Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-1210) as being both in conflict with 
the EAA and an unconstitutional infringement on student speech, 
association, expression, and—sometimes—religious rights. In the 
interest of avoiding liability for violation of a “clearly established” 
constitutional right, it would behoove school districts to obtain an 
opinion from the Georgia Attorney General, from their school board 
counsel, or thwart implementation of the statute and await further 
guidance from the courts.159 Otherwise, what generally would result in, at 
most, a preliminary injunction against the school for imposing the statute 
may result in damages levied against the school districts. 
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